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JURISDICTION AND
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment
of dismissal after a civil jury triafL.
Appellate jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to
§78-2-2(3)(i) Utah Code Ann.

This case was poured over to

the Court of Appeals pursuant to §78r2-2(4) Utah Code Ann.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves an auto^truck accident.

The

jury returned a verdict "no cause of action" for defendants.
Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff (Ostler) asks this Court to direct a
verdict that defendant (Wheeler) was iconcurrently negligent
as a matter of law.

In the alternative, plaintiff (Ostler)

seeks a new trial.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court err by excluding certain

evidence proferred on the issue of prbximate cause?
2.

Did the trial court err by unduly restricting

impeachment evidence?
xii

3.

Did the trial court err by permitting certain

prejudicial statements in closing argument?
4-

Did the trial court err by incorrectly

instructing the jury on proximate cause, independent
intervening cause, and a trucker's federal duty to set out
warning devices?
5.

Did the trial court err by failing to direct a

verdict in plaintiff's (appellant's) favor?

FACTS1

Ralph Ostler (hereafter Ostler) was a passenger
riding with his father Stephen Ostler (hereafter father
Ostler) on the interstate freeway.

Stanley Wheeler (hereaf-

ter Wheeler) was driving a semi-truck on the freeway
travelling the same direction as father Ostler.
Sometime around 2:00 a.m., P.S.T., Wheeler stopped
his semi-truck off the travelled lanes of the highway and on the paved shoulder.

(Sometimes referred to as the emergency

lane.)
xiii

^-All citations to the record are included at Point I,
below.

Wheeler claims that he stopped for only about three
minutes to urinate.

Wheeler claims |that he turned on his

flashing taillights, but he did not fset out any flares or
other emergency signals.
Father Ostler somehow drifted into the emergency
lane and crashed into the rear of th£ parked semi-truck.
Father Ostler was killed.

Ralph OstJLer was paralyzed from

the waist down.
This case involves only th^ claim by Ralph Ostler
against Wheeler and Wheeler's employers.

No claim for father

Ostler is included herein.
At trial, Ralph Ostler conceded that father Ostler
was negligent and partly at fault foir drifting into the
emergency lane.

After the first witness testified, the

court directed a verdict that Wheeled was also negligent for
making an illegal stop.
proximate cause.

Thusf a centjral issue at trial was

Specifically, was father Ostler the sole

proximate cause of the injuries; or v^as Wheeler the sole
proximate cause of the injuries, or v^ere father Ostler and
Wheeler combined the proximate cause |of the injuries?
(Sometimes called concurrent negligenbe.)
The jury returned a verdict that father Ostler was
the sole proximate cause of the injuries.

Ostler brings this

appeal claiming several errors in the| trial court.
xiv

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT ONE:
The trial court excluded vjirtually all of Ostler's
evidence on proximate cause.

The rujling was based on Rule

702, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Howevelr, most of the evidence

was not within the common knowledge |of the jury.

Moreover,

the evidence should be admitted if i|t would be "helpful" to
the jury.

POINT TWO;
The trial court excluded certain preliminary fact
questions from the jury.

However, pursuant to Rule 104(b),

Utah Rules of Evidence, these preliminary fact issues are for
the jury.

POINT THREE:
The trial court did not peirmit Ostler to impeach as
permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence.

POINT FOUR:
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney misstated
the law of proximate cause.

The cour[t failed to correct that

error.
xv

POINT FIVE:
In closing argument, Wheeller's attorney argued that
any judgment would come from his client's pocket.
not true.

That was

Any judgment would come fprom the insurance

company.

POINT SIX:
The trial court refused to! permit Ostler to amend
the Complaint to add a claim for punitive damages.
of the jury's verdict, that issue was moot.

Because

However, if the

case is remanded for a new trial, Ostler should be permitted
to amend.

The grounds for punitive damages are that

Wheeler's conduct in driving in an exhausted condition was in
reckless disregard of the public safety.

POINT SEVEN:
Federal statutes require truckers to set out flares
or triangles when they stop in the emergency lane.

The

court's instruction substituted a reasonable man standard.
However, state law is pre-empted in t|he field.

xv i

POINT EIGHT:
Prior to trial, the insured in this case sent antitort propaganda to all of its policyholders in Utah County.
The trial court refused to permit vo^Lr dire on that issue.

POINT NINE:
Ostler's expert made a videotape to show what would
have happened if the semi-truck had hot been illegally
parked.

The film was excluded.

Sincjre the circumstances of

the film and the accident were essentially similar, the film
should have been received.

Differences go to weight—not

admissibility.

POINT TEN:
The trial court's instruction on independent
i
i

intervening cause was so confusing that no lay person could
understand it.

Furthermore, the instruction was incorrect

because there are several types of intervening causes that do
not break the chain of causation.
POINT ELEVEN:
Wheeler's illegal parking in the emergency lane set
up a chain of events ended in the accident.
xvii

Therefore

Wheeler must be a proximate cause (or concurrently negligent) of the ciccident as a matter of law.

xviii

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED
ALL EVIDENCE REGARDING
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Ostler admitted that his father was negligent and
partly at fault in causing the accident.

(Tr. 86.)

However,

Ostler claimed that Wheeler (the semi-truck driver) was
concurrently negligent.*
Early in the trial, the court directed a verdict
that Wheeler was negligent.

(Tr. 131-132.)

The basis for

the court's ruling was §41-6-103(1)(i), Utah Code Ann.;
No person shall: stop, stand or park a
vehicle. . .or park a vehicle. . .on any
controlled access highway. . .
However, the court reserved the issue of whether or not
Wheeler's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries.
(Tr. 132).

-•-Concurrent negligence has been (defined by our Supreme
Court as follows:
"The law does not recognize only one
proximate cause of an injury, consisting
of only one factor, one actj, or the
conduct of only one person.| To the
contrary, the acts of two dr more persons
may work concurrently as the efficient
cause of an injury, and in such case,
each of the participating acts or
omissions is regarded in lalw as a
proximate cause and both may be held
liable.
Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Ut. 1984).

Thus, a major portion of the trial revolved around
proximate cause.

Virtually, all of Ostler's evidence on

proximate cause was rejected by the trial court.

A.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Moth Phenomenon.

Ostler proferred evidence that father Ostler was
not asleep; rather, he was in a reduced state of alertness
which is rather common to drivers at night on long stretches
of road.

During nighttime driving, the eyes of the driver

generally focus on the taillights of the cars ahead.
However, in this reduced state of alertness, a tired driver
may not be able to tell whether the taillights ahead are
parked or moving.

Thus, father Ostler drove straight toward

the lights of the parked truck, thinking all the time that he
was following moving traffic.

In this reduced state of

alertness, he was not aware that the truck was parked on the
shoulder of the road until it was too late.

(Tr. 227-228.)

This is sometimes called the "moth phenomenon."2

(Tr. 273.)

There was some testimony that the parked semi-truck
may have had blinking or flashing taillights on.

z

However,

This condition is also called "highway hypnosis."

237. )
2

(Tr.

that fact does not necessarily mean that it was parked.
slow moving vehicles use flashing taillights.

Some

(Tr. 228-229.)

Furthermore, flashing taillights somehow "lure" a sleepy
driver more than steady taillights.

(Tr. 229-230.)

For

example, California Highway Patrol cars are struck approximately 15 times per month while parked with flashing
lights.

Upon the advice of Ostler's expert, the California

Highway Patrol has done away with off-and-on flashers.

(Tr.

231.)
If the Wheeler truck had n<t>t been illegally parked
in the emergency lane, father Ostler!would probably have
recovered from his highway hypnosis without consequence.
(Tr. 2 31.)
The "moth phenomenon" is well-known in the field of
highway design.

(Tr. 231, 275 and 276.)

Indeed, the Federal

Department of Transportation has recently recognized the
"moth phenomenon" as an industry-wid^ problem.

B.

(Tr. 284.)

Exclusion of Evidence That Father Ostler Was Awake.
Of course, the "moth phenomenon" only works if the

driver's eyes are open.

If the driver's eyes are closed (or

asleep), the "moth phenomenon" could have no effect.

3

Thus, a

preliminary fact issue was whether or not father Ostler was
asleep when he hit the back of Wheeler's truck.
Ralph Ostler's experts testified that father
Ostler was not asleep; but rather in a reduced state of
awareness (sometimes called highway hypnosis).
that testimony was as follows:

The basis for

First, Wheeler testified, by

offer of proof, that father Ostler appeared as if he were
awake:
MR. WHEELER: "Well, it appeared to me as
if the guy was driving in a daze. He
cut over like he went, opps(sic), I'm off
the road, and cut over figuring this
truck was on the road, and just pulled
right directly in behind me. And there
was nothing I could do, just sit there
and hold on."
QUESTION: "Was it a sudden cut or did he
sort of gradually veer off?"
ANSWER: "No, it was like he was changing
lanes, like you change lanes going down
the freeway."
QUESTION: "Now prior to the time he made
this fairly sudden lane change, what lane
had he been in?"
ANSWER: "I couldn't tell you that. I
really couldn't. It looked, I just don't
know, but you know it was very apparent
that he was pulling, trying to get in
behind me, that's the way I'm looking at
it any way. It looked like he thought to
himself, 'I'm off the road and that

4

truck's on the road, and I'd better get
in behind him.'M3
(Tr. 256.)
Second, the shallow angle of impact indicates to a
reconstructionist that the driver was awake.

If a driver

fell asleep, the car would probably make a more sudden turn.
(Tr. 249-250.)

Ostler's expert was able to monitor this

phenomenon in his sleep laboratory.

(Tr. 251.)

Third, there was testimony that father Ostler had
stated he was not tired at the previous road stop.

(Tr.

250.)
Fourth, there was a curve in the roadway just prior
to the accident scene.

If father Ostler had been asleep, he

would have run straight off the road at the curve.

(Tr.

252.)
Fifth, there was testimony |that a sleeping truck
driver would relax to such an extent that he would not keep
his foot on the gas.

(Tr. 283.)

In this case, the Ostler

vehicle was travelling at approximatejly 4 8 miles per hour at
impact.

(R. 1029.)

The inference is| that father Ostler was

^Wheeler's observations were made through his rear view
mirror. However, Ostler's expert has done special research
with respect to mirrors on trucks. (Tr. 253.)
5

not asleep or the Ostler vehicle would have slowed down more.
(Tr. 283.)
The court rejected all of this evidence.

Thus, the

court stated:
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis
for a determination on his part that
there was a man that was either, that was
not asleep, or that he was merely
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of
things around him.
(Tr. 245.)
This issue is controlled by Rule 104(b), Utah Rules
of Evidence.
Preliminary Questions. When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding of the fulfillment
of the condition.
The Federal Advisory Committee Comment on this
section is instructive.
If preliminary questions of conditional
relevancy were determined solely by the
judge, as provided in subdivision (a),
the functioning of the jury as a trier of
fact would be greatly restricted and in
some cases virtually destroyed. These
are appropriate questions for juries.
Accepted treatment, as provided in the
rule, is consistent with that given fact
questions generally. The judge makes a
preliminary finding of fulfillment of the
condition. If so, the item is admitted.
If after all the evidence on the issue is
in, pro and con, the jury could reasonab6

ly conclude that fulfillment of the
condition is not established, the issue
is for them. If the evidence is not such
as to allow a finding, the judge
withdraws the matter from their consideration.
(Compare Tr. 291.) See also Huddleston v. United States,
U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988
In determining whether the) government has
introduced sufficient evidence to meet
Rule 104(b), the trial court neither
weighs credibility nor makes a finding
that the government has proved the
conditional fact by a preponderance of
the evidence. The court simply examines
all the evidence in the case and decides
whether the jury could reasonably find
the conditional fact. . .by a preponderance of the evidence.
Whether father Ostler was asleep or awake is a
preliminary fact issue.

Here, the judge should have made a

"preliminary determination" that there was sufficient basis^
for the jury to conclude that father Ostler was awake.

Thus,

the jury should have been permitted ^o hear the evidence and
make their own decision.
Whether Wheeler was a proximate cause of Ostler's
injuries is the ultimate fact issue.

Ostler claims that

Wheeler was a proximate cause, on th4 theory that the "moth
4

The basis was, first, that fatHer Ostler appeared to be
awake; second, a shallow angle of impact; third, father
Ostler said he was not tired; and fourth, father Ostler must
have been awake to negotiate the curye. (See above.)
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phenomenon" lured father Ostler into the illegally parked
truck.

After the jury heard evidence on the preliminary

fact issue (viz. whether father Ostler was asleep or awake),
the jury should then have heard the expert evidence on the
ultimate issue (viz. "moth effect").

C.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Violation of Federal
Regulation.
Ostler's expert proffered testimony describing the

purpose of federal trucking regulations.

Specifically, the

purpose of these regulations is to keep exhausted drivers
off the road.

(Tr. 159.)

The Federal regulations which relate to this case
are:
49 C.F.R. §395.3(a)(1) (sometimes called the 10-Hour Rule):
No motor carrier shall permit or require
any driver used by it to drive nor shall
any driver drive. . .more than 10 hours
following eight consecutive hours off
duty.
49 C.F.R. §395.3(a)(2) (sometimes called the 15-Hour Rule):
No motor carrier shall permit or require
any driver used by it to drive, nor shall
any driver drive. . .for any period after
having been on duty 15 hours following
eight consecutive hours off duty.
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49 C.F.R. §395.3(b) (sometimes called the 70-Hour Rule):
No motor carrier shall permit or require
any driver used by it to bb on duty. . .
more than 70 hours in any period of eight
consecutive days.
49 C.F.R. §391.2 (fatigue):
No driver shall operate a jnotor vehicle. . .while the driver's ability or
alertness is so impaired, or so likely to
become impaired through fatigue, illness
or any other cause, as to make it unsafe
for him to begin or continue to operate
the motor vehicle.
Ostler's expert audited Whteeler's driving logs and
came to the following conclusions:

<pn the day of the

accident, Wheeler was 25.25 hours ovtr the 10-hour limit;
26.75 hours over the 15-hour limit; and 86.25 hours over the
70-hour limit.

(Tr. 160.)

Because <f)f these violations,

Wheeler was absolutely exhausted at the time of the accident.
(Tr. 5.)

Because Wheeler was exhausted, he had to stop and

have coffee shortly before the accident.

That coffee acted

as a diuretic causing Wheeler to stob and urinate.
125.)

(Tr.

Furthermore, in such an exhausted condition, Wheeler's

judgment was not good.

In summary, the cause of Wheeler

pulling off the road to make the illegal stop was because he
was exhausted, his judgment wasn't g6od, and he drank coffee
until his bladder wasn't good.

9

(Tr. 126.)

The trial court refused to receive this testimony
regarding violations of the federal regulations.

(Tr. 23,

29, 38, 118, 172.)

D.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Purpose of the Emergency
Lane:
Ostler's expert proferred testimony on the purpose

of the emergency lane.

According to the expert, the purpose

of the emergency lane was to accommodate disabled vehicles;
and to serve as a safe recovery zone for errant vehicles.
(Tr. 222-223-)
The court refused to receive the testimony.

(Tr.

254. )

E.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Foreseeability (Road
Designers).
Ostler's expert proferred testimony that road

designers assume that errant vehicles will from time-tor-time
run into the emergency lane when they design highways.
224.)
This testimony was also rejected.
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(Tr. 254.)

(Tr.

F.

Exclusion of Evidence of Foresefeability (Truck Drivers)

Ostler's expert (Hewitt5) hroferred

testimony that

it is foreseeable to a reasonable truck driver, parked on the
paved shoulder (emergency lane) thatiother errant vehicles
might stray and hit him.

Hewitt testified that this is a

common subject that comes up at almost every seminar.
286.)

This testimony was also rejected.

(Tr.

(Tr. 293.)

Hewitt also proferred a handout which he passes out
at every meeting he has attended as he trains companies and
trains their drivers in safety procedures.

(Tr. 864-865.)

The handout (Exhibit 82) is attached as Exhibit A to this
brief.

The handout states:

interstates."

"Never ^top on freeways or

Exhibit 82 was also refused by the trial

court.
Wheeler admitted that his practice was to stop at
rest stops and not alongside the roaq—"for safety reasons."
(Wheeler depo., p. 36.)

5

Hewitt is a member of the Natiolnal Accident Review
Board (Tr. 270); past president of the Arizona Motor
Transportation Assn.; a member of the| National Committee of
Motor Carrier Fleet Training; and developer of over 200
audio-visual training programs for mo|tor fleet training.
(Tr. 271-272.)
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G.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Test Results

Ostler's experts re-created the accident to see
what would have happened if Wheeler's truck had not been
illegally parked.

The experiment showed that father Ostler

would have run harmlessly into a field if the truck had not
been parked illegally.
also excluded.

H.

(R. 1028-1031.)

This evidence was

(R. 1197.) 6

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Emergency Devices

49 C.F.R. §392.22(b) governs a truck driver's duty
to set out warning devices.

The regulation states:

[W]henever a vehicle is stopped upon the
shoulder of a highway [or emergency lane]
for any cause other than necessary
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon
as possible, but in any event within 10
minutes, place the warning devices
[flares, or lanterns or triangles].
Ostler's expert testified that the accident would
have been avoided if the warning devices had been used.
232-233/ 284.)

(Tr.

The trial court refused to receive the expert

testimony regarding warning devices.

(Tr. 246.)

This issue is separately discussed in Point IX, below.
12

I.

The Excluded Evidence was Admissible.

This case is controlled byj the Restatement of
Torts,2d, §447: 7
Negligence of Intervening Acts.
The fact that an intervening act of
a third person is negligent in itself or
is done in a negligent manher does not
make it a superseding cause of harm to
another which the actor's negligent
conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct should have realized
that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man|knowing the
situation existing when the act of the
third person was done woultpi not regard it
as highly extraordinary th^t the third
person had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal
consequence of a situation created by the
actor's conduct and the manner in-which
it is done is not extraordinarily
negligent.
The comment on Clause C, Restatement of Torts,2d,
§447, states:
The words "extraordinarily [negligent"
denote the fact that men of ordinary
experience and reasonable judgment,
7

This section of the Restatement! has been specifically
adopted by our Supreme Court in Harris v. Utah Transit
Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983).
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looking at the matter after the event and
taking into account the prevalence of
that "occasional negligence, which is one
of the incidents of human life," would
not regard it as extraordinary that the
third person's intervening act should
have been done in the negligent manner in
which it was done. Since the third
person's action is a product of the
actor's negligent conduct, there is good
reason for holding him responsible for
its effects, even though it be done in a
negligent manner, unless the nature or
extent of the negligence is altogether
unusual.
The best example of §447(a) is Godesky v. Provo
City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984) which states:
An intervening negligent act does not
automatically become a superseding cause
that relieves the original actor of
liability. The earlier actor [viz.
Wheeler] is charged with the foreseeable
negligent acts of others [viz. father
Ostler]. Therefore, if the intervening
negligence is foreseeable, the earlier
negligent act is a concurring cause.
"[T]his includes situations where
negligent or other wrongful conduct of
others should reasonably be anticipated."
[Citations omitted.]
*

•

*

*

It is not necessary that the specific
injury be foreseen as long as a person of
ordinary prudence could foresee, as a
result of his action or inaction, the
possibility of some injury. . .
There are numerous examples of §477(b) and (c):
See e.g. Sheel v. Tremblay, 312 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1973)(it was
not extraordinary that a car should veer slightly off a
14

winding road and strike negligently located utility pole.);
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 67|L P.2d 217 (Utah 1983)
(bus negligently stopped with rear ejid extended partially
into street; however, defendant bus driver would be responsible for a momentarily inattentive driver, which is not so
"extraordinary" as to be unforeseeable).
In summary, all of the prorerred evidence was
relevant because it answers the questions set forth in §447
of the Restatement.

J.

Specifically:

A.

Whether father Ostlerfs
negligence was reasonably
"foreseeable." Restatement,
§447(a).

B.

Whether father Ostlerfs
negligence was "highl^ extraordinary." Restatement] §447(b).

C.

Whether father Ostler Is
negligence was a normal (not
extraordinary) consequence of
the situation created by
Wheeler's negligence and "not
extraordinarily negligent."
Restatement §447(c).

Basis for the Trial Court's Exclusion of Evidence.

Wheeler filed motions i_n lijmine to exclude the
testimony of Ostler's experts in totcj.
based on a variety of grounds.
15

The motions were

(R. 1|557 —1572 and R. 1531-

1545.

See also, Tr. 154.)

However, the basis for the

court's ruling was that the testimony would not be helpful to
the jury.

Specifically, the court stated:
It seems to me that that's something that
the jury can, just as well as anyone
else, can infer and can determine from
their own experience in this type of
circumstance. . .
•

*

•

*

. . .I'm still persuaded that this is
something that the testimony of the
expert is not going to be particularly
helpful to the jury.
(Tr. 245 and 293.)
K.

Qualifications of Stephen Ostler's Expert (Hulbert).

Dr. Hulbert is a human factors research scientist."

A human factors scientist studies human behavior in

the workplace.

(Tr. 205.)

Dr. Hulbert has contributed to

virtually all signs, signals, and pavement markings which we
encounter on today's highways.
b

(Tr. 106.)

For example, he

Human factors engineering is a rather new discipline
dating from World War II. However, courts routinely receive
expert testimony from human factors scientists: See e.g.
Wright v. Las Vegas Hacienda, 720 P.2d 697 (Nev. 19 86);
Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 381 So.2d 229 (Fla.
1980); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D.
1977); Scott v. Sears & Roebuck, 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir.
19 86); Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 675 F.2d 1185
(1982); Public Health Foundation, Etc. v. Cole, 352 So.2d 877
(Fla. App. 1977).
16

helped develop the "Do Not Enter" reki and white signs along
the freeway.

(Tr. 207.)

Human factbrs scientists must work

hand-in-hand with traffic engineers |in developing traffic
control devices.

One ofj Dr. Hulbert's recent

(Tr. 208.)

assignments was to study truck drivejr alertness at Kennecott
Copper Mines.

(Tr. 209-210.)

Dr. HUlbert has published 80-

90 publications in his field ihcludi hg several studies on
falling asleep at the wheel.

(Tr. 2 11.)

One of Dr.

Hulbert's articles dealt with highway hypnosis.

(Tr. 2 37.)

Dr. Hulbert also operated a research driving simulation
laboratory for the State of California.

(Tr. 211-212.)

In

that laboratory, Hulbert made special studies of drivers
falling asleep at the wheel.

(Tr. 213-215.)

testified twice before Congress.

Dr. Hulbert has

(Tr, 215-216.)

Dr. Hulbert

also served as a consultant to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration.

Dr. Hulbert also consulted with the

California State Highway Patrol on tme special problem of
sleepy drivers running into patrol cars parked in the
emergency lane with flashers on.

(Tr. 231.)

Admissibility of the Excluded Evidence

No one seriously contends tlhat the excluded
evidence was not relevant.

Rather, i|t appears that the Court
17

excluded the evidence pursuant to Rule 702, Utah Rules of
Evidence.

(See paragraph J, above.)

Rule 702 states:

If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.
(Emphasis added.)
At common law, expert testimony would be excluded
if it involved a matter of common knowledge of the jurors.
However, Rule 702 has changed all of that.

Expert opinion

may now be received on matters within the common knowledge of
jurors if the expert testimony would assist the jurors to
better understand the evidence.
Evidence, §702.4 (2nd Ed. 1986).

West's Handbook of Federal
Thus, it has been held

that,
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed
if his testimony will be helpful to the
trier of fact in understanding evidence
that is simply difficult [though] not
beyond ordinary understanding.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd Cir.
1985) .
In effect, Rule 702 has adopted the position long
urged by Wigmore:
The true test of admissibility of such
testimony is not whether the subject
matter is common or uncommon, or whether
18

many persons or few have s|ome knowledge
of the matter; but, it is whether the
witnesses offered as experts have any
peculiar knowledge or experience, not
common to the world, which renders their
opinions founded on such knowledge or
experience any aid to the court or the
jury in determining the qulelestions at
issue.
7 Wigmore, Evidence, §1923, at 31-32| (Chadbourne Rev. 1978).
In this case, jurors may have some common knowledge
about sleepy drivers.

However, therp is no reason to suppose

that an average juror has any way to know that a sleepy
driver might be "lured" into the taillights of a parked
truck--like a moth to the flame.

Indeed, Ostler's expert

testified that he must frequently explain this phenomenon to
accident investigators.

(Tr. 281-28B.)

If some accident

investigators don't understand the "jnoth phenomenon," it
cannot be common knowledge to the jujry.
If the "moth phenomenon" testimony was not
admissible on Ostler's case in chief I it should have been
admissible on rebuttal.
nighttime photos.

The defense sponsored certain

Those photos purpart to show how the truck

appeared at night at 400-foot distance.
Tr. 814.)

(See Ex. 53; compare

Next, Wheeler's expert testified that a driver

should be able to stop within that s^me 400 feet.

The

assumption is that father Ostler was awake and should have
seen the truck with plenty of time tq> stop.
19

(Tr. 820.)

If

father Ostler was asleep, Exhibit 53 wouldn't matter (because
father Ostler didn't see the truck at 400 feet).

Thus

defendant's Exhibit 53 rests on exactly the same foundation
as Ostler's "moth effect" testimony.

(Compare Tr. 245.)

Since Exhibit 53 came in, Ostler should have been permitted
to bring in the "moth phenomenon" testimony on rebuttal.
That was refused.

(Tr. 850-852.)

Furthermore, a jury probably has some common
knowledge that flares would alert a sleepy driver to danger.
However, it would be "helpful" for the jury to understand why
a sleepy driver reacts differently to flares than to
taillights.

After Dr. Hulbert gave his opinion that flares

or triangles would have avoided the accident, the following
colloquy took place:
THE COURT: Well, Doctor, do you have to
be an expert to appreciate that?
THE WITNESS: Well, not necessarily to
appreciate it, your Honor. That's -THE COURT:
it?

Or understand it, or accept

THE WITNESS: Well, it's that way with
human factors testimony, your Honor, that
there is a good deal of reasonable common
sense to it.
Now, the problem is that not all
persons have analyzed these matters. And
the advent and use of these triangles and
the research studies that have been done
on them have not all, not been done that
20

many years ago. So we are dealing here
with a fairly, excuse me, a fairly recent
understanding of these matters in depth,
that not necessarily would be expected to
be available to the lay person. Sure,
they can understand it once it's
explained. But not necessarily would
they have such an awareness without such
explanation. (Tr. 233-234 ;)
The average lay juror would not have any reason to
understand the purpose of the emergency lane.

The average

juror probably thinks the emergency lane is to be used to
stop and urinate or stretch.

In fact, the very opposite is

true.

In a v^ry similar case, it has

(See para. D, above.)

been held reversible error to exclud^ expert testimony on the
purpose of the emergency lane.

Roby by and through Roby v.

Kingsley, 492 So.2d 789 (Fla. App. 1986) (copy attached as
Exhibit B ) .
Nor, would the average juror have any reason to
know that truckers get special instructions never to park in
the emergency lane except for a true emergency.

(See para.

F, above.)
In summary, most of the proferred testimony was
outside the common knowledge of the jury.

Perhaps some

minor parts of the testimony were within the jury's common
knowledge.

Even so, the testimony wotald have been "helpful"

to assist the jury to better understand the circumstances.
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Thus, the testimony should have been received pursuant to
Rule 702.
M.

Standard of Review for Excluded Evidence.

The standard of review for erroneous exclusion of
expert testimony is generally abuse of discretion.

Utah

Dept. of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984).
However, it has been said that:
Basic policy questions that affect the
very nature of a trial lie behind
decisions to receive expert testimony.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
experts not only explain evidence, but
are themselves sources of evidence.
These two roles, though related, are
quite distinct. In deciding whether
explanation by an expert will assist the
jury or judge, the superior position of
the trial judge over the appellate judge
is apparent. By comparison, in deciding
whether evidence should be allowed from
the source, the trial judge draws less
upon the scene and the cast immediately
before him, and more upon the substantive
law. To the extent that the decision to
allow expert testimony as a source of
evidence is significantly intertwined
with the underlying substantive law, we
will accord it less deference, and take a
much closer look.
In Re;

Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230,

1233-34 (5th Cir. 1986) .
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N.

Prejudice Because of Excluded Evidence.

Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless
a substantial right of a party is
affected.
In this case, Wheeler got to tell his side of the
story,

Wheeler's story is that he stropped his truck for only

2-3 minutes on a straight stretch of road where he could see
for over a mile.

He stopped at 2:00 a.m. when the road was

virtually deserted.

His truck was parked partly on the

gravel and over four feet off the travelled way.
his flashing lights.

He engaged

Father Ostler went to sleep at the

wheel and crashed into the rear of the truck.

(Tr. 92-97.)

The jury heard all of this evidence.
Ostler's side of the story iis somewhat different.
Ostler's story is that Wheeler was driving in an exhausted
condition.

Indeed, at the time of th|e accident, Wheeler was

26.25 hours over the Federal 10-hour limit
exhaustion, Wheeler's judgment was injpaired.

Because of this
Wheeler, there-

fore, stopped on the emergency lane t|o urinate.

In fact, the

urge to urinate was caused because Whieeler had drunk too much
coffee trying to stay awake.

The emergency lane where

Wheeler stopped was designed to be us|ed only for true
23

emergencies (not to urinate).

Indeed, Wheeler had received

training never to stop on the emergency lane except for a
true emergency.

At that time, father Ostler was not asleep.

Rather, he was in a reduced state of awareness (from highway
hypnosis).

In that state of reduced awareness, the tail-

lights of the truck "lured" him as a moth to the flame.
Father Ostler did not realize the truck was parked until too
late.

If the truck had not been illegally parked, father

Ostler would have, harmlessly, run into a flat adjoining
field.
The jury did not hear one iota of Ostler's side of
the story.^

It was then no wonder that he lost the trial.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT UNDULY RESTRICTED
OSTLER f S RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WHEELER
ON THE ISSUE OF SEARCHING FOR A PLACE TO URINATE

A.

The Proferred Evidence.
Ostler's attorney asked Wheeler the following

question:

"How long had you been looking for a place to stop

and urinate before you actually stopped?"

y

At that point,

Ostler's cost for experts that the jury never got to
hear was over $22,000. (R. 1875.)
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Wheeler's lawyer objected.
the objection.

(Tr. 116|. )

The judge sustained

(Tr. 123.)

An offer of proof was made lout of the hearing of
the jury.

As part of the offer of proof, Wheeler testified

(outside the presence of the jury) tnat he had been looking
for approximately 30 minutes for a place to stop and urinate.
(Tr. 122.)

Ostler's attorney then offered Exhibit 4 as a

part of the offer of proof.
of the general area.

Exhibit|4 was a large aerial map

The aerial map showed that within 8-10

minutes prior to parking, Wheeler parsed the following signs
and exits:
1.

South Santaquin One Mi^le;

2.

South Santaquin Exit;

3.

South Santaquin Exit;

4.

Santaquin One Mile;

5.

Santaquin Next Right;

6.

Santaquin Exit;

7.

Payson Three Miles;

8.

Payson One Mile.

The court sustained the objlection and overruled the
offer of proof.

(Tr. 124.)

Later iri the trial, Ostler's

attorney renewed the request to ask hjow lonq Wheeler was
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looking for a place to urinate.

(Tr. 630.)

The court again

sustained the objection and overruled the offer of proof.
(Tr. 635.)
issue.

B.

Ostler made a motion for a mistrial on this

The motion was denied.

(Tr. 658.)

Relevance.

Wheeler was asked how long he was parked at the
side of the road prior to the accident.
was:

three minutes at the very most.

Wheeler's response
(Tr. 182-183.)

However, there was a second version of how long he
was stopped.

Wheeler's driver's l o g ^ showed the accident

time to be 2:00 a.m. Pacific Standard Time.

(Tr. 113.)

A

few hours after the accident, Wheeler gave a tape recorded
statement answering certain questions about the accident.

In

that statement, he said that he pulled off the highway about
1:30 or 1:45.

(Tr. 191.)

Thus, according to the contem-

poraneous documents, he had been parked for 15-30 minutes at
the time of the accident. -*-•**
-^Required by the Federal government.
•'--'•Ostler's prior offer of proof was that Wheeler was 25
hours over his legal driving time and was, therefore,
exhausted. (See Tr. 126, above.) The inference is that he
stopped to sleep--not to urinate. Interestingly, Wheeler
gave a written statement to the police shortly after the
26

This testimony relates dirlectly to 49 C .F.R. ,
§392.22(b), which states:
Whenever a vehicle is stopbed upon the
shoulder of a highway for any cause other
than necessary traffic stops, the driver
shall as soon as possible, but in any
event within 10 minutes pilace the warning
devices: rflares or lanterns or triangles] ii
The impeachment theory was simple.

If Wheeler lied

about looking 30 minutes for a place to urinate-'-^, he might
also be lying about how long he was ^topped.
classic textbook type of impeachment
Rules of Evidence:

This was a

See Rule 607, Utah

"The credibility of a witness may be

attacked by any party. . ." (Emphasi b added.)
For a variety of similar examples, see McCormick,
Evidence §47 at 111-112 n.19 (3rd Ed

1984):

(See e.g., East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co,
v. Daniels, 91 Ga. 768, 18 S.E. 22
(1893)(witness of alleged killing of mule
at crossing accounted for his presence by
saying he left home to get| some tobacco,

l^It was conceded that Wheeler ([lid not place the warning
devices. (Tr. 183-184.)
^Obviously, Wheeler could have|stopped at any of
numerous exits to urinate.
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going to a certain store and getting the
tobacco on credit, and on his way home he
saw the accident; adversary offered
evidence of storekeeper that witness did
not buy tobacco at that time, held,
erroneously excluded, "it was indirectly
material because it contradicted the
witness as to the train of events which
led him to be present"); Stephens v.
People, 19 N.Y. 549, 572 (1859)(murder
by poisoning with arsenic, defendant's
witnesses testified the arsenic was
administered to rats in cellar where
provisions kept; held proper for state to
prove by another witness that no
provisions were kept in cellar, "not
strictly collateral"); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry.
Co. v. Matthews, 100 Tex. 63, 93 S.W.
1068, 1070 (1906) (suit for death of M.,
run over by train; controverted issue was
whether M. was sober and walking or drunk
and lying on tracks; A., a hotel clerk,
crucial witness for plaintiff, said M.
left hotel early in morning, sober: foul
play in the death of M. was publicly
suspected; A. said on cross-examination
that he had never mentioned M.'s presence
and departure from hotel except a couple
of times to one W.; defendant offered
evidence that A. when he gave above
testimony by deposition believed W. was
dead, and produced W. and offered proof
by him that A. had never told him about
M.'s presence in the hotel; held
exclusion of defendant's evidence was
error. "Evidence therefore which bears
upon the story of a witness with
sufficient directness and force to give
it appreciable value in determining
whether or not that story is true cannot
be said to be addressed to an irrelevant
or collateral issue. . .The effort of the
defendant was. . .to maintain its
contention that he had never told any
one; and that fact being relevant, the
defendant had the right, we think, to
meet his apparent effort to break its
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force."); Hartsfield v. Carolina Cas.
Ins. Co., 451 P.2d 576 (Alaska 1969)(on
issue whether insurance cancellation
notice was sent to defendant by insurer,
defendant denied receipt and also receipt
of notices of cancellations of the
insurance from two other sources.
Evidence of the mailing by the two latter
sources was held not collateral.")
The court's refusal to allow such impeachment was
clearly prejudicial.

Wheeler was the sole eyewitness.

Without the ability to impeach, defendant Wheeler was
permitted to stick to his self-servihg story that he had only
stopped for three minutes to urinate.

If the court had

permitted a searching cross-examination and impeachment,
Ostler may have convinced the jury that Wheeler had been
there for 15-30 minutes--not to urinate, but to sleep.

C.

Standard of Review.

It is true that the trial court has a good deal of
discretion in regulating the scope of the impeachment.
However, the court has no power to totally exclude impeachment on a particular subject.

See J<fef ferson-Gravois Bank v.

Cunningham, 674 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. App. 1984).
Moreover, the trial court simply didn't understand
the law of impeachment.

The trial court supposed that

impeachment was only possible if theipe was a prior inconsis29

tent statement.

(Tr. 635.)

In fact, the prior inconsistent

statement is just one mode of impeachment.
other modes of permissible impeachment.
Federal Evidence, §607.1.

There are several

West's Handbook of

See also Rules 608(a), 608(b),

609, Utah Rules of Evidence.

If the Court bases its

conclusion on a misunderstanding of the law, discretion is
abused.

Winqert v. W . C A . B . , 468 A.2d 526, 528 (Pa. App.

1983); Schmidt v. Olsen, 330 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Wis. 1983).

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT UNDULY RESTRICTED
OSTLER f S RIGHT TO IMPEACH WHEELER BY PRIOR BAD ACTS
As part of the case-in-chief, Ostler proffered
evidence that Wheeler had violated the 10-Hour Rule, the 15Hour Rule, and the 70-Hour Rule.
evidence.

The court rejected the

(See Point 1(C), above.)
Later in the trial, Ostler attempted to offer the

same evidence, not as affirmative evidence, but as impeachment.

(Tr. 198.)

Evidence^.

See Rule 404(b) and 608(b), Utah Rules of

Specifically, Ostler attempted to show that

Wheeler had been driving for 25 hours over the legal limit at

Full text of Rules at Exhibit C.
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the time of the accident.

(Tr. 126 and 363.)

Further, that

Wheeler had violated the 10-hour rulkle by 25.25 hours; he had
violated the 15-hour rule by 26.75 hours; and he had violated
the 70-hour rule by 86.25 hours.

(Tr. 160 and 363.)

Although the Court did permit some 1|:imited impeachment,
Ostler was not allowed to ask about the specific violations
described above.

(Tr. 363-364.)

The recent case of Huddleston v. United States,
U.S.

, 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d 771; 56 L.W.

4363 (1988) is on point.
selling stolen goods.

Huddleston was on trial for

The government offered evidence that

Huddleston had tried to sell stolen goods on a prior
The evidence of the prior bad act was not offered

occasion.

to show that Huddleston was a bad ma \f\; rather, it was offered
to show that Huddleston had knowledge that the items were
stolen.

The

U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the evidence ot the crime was
admissible.

Specifically, the court said:

In determining whether theigovernment has
introduced sufficient evidence to meet
Rule 104(b), the trial court neither
weighs credibility nor makes a finding
that the government has proved the
conditional fact by a preponderance of
the evidence. The court simply examines
all the evidence in the case and decides
whether the jury could reasonably find
the conditional fact. . .by a preponderance of the evidence.
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During the trial, Wheeler was asked how long he
was stopped before the accident,

(See Point 11(B), above.)

Wheeler had a powerful motive to lie.

If Wheeler said he was

parked 15-30 minutes (to sleep—not to urinate), his
violation of drive time regulations might have come to the
attention of Federal authorities.

However, Wheeler could

cover-up his exhaustion by saying that he had parked for only
three minutes to urinate.

Therefore, the impeachment

testimony was proper on the issue of motive pursuant to Rule
104(b).

POINT IV
WHEELER'S LAWYER WAS
PERMITTED TO MISSTATE THE
LAW DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney was
permitted to argue that:
Foreseeability has to do with whether he
[Wheeler] could perceive, that in his
drive, Stephen Ostler would at that
precise moment become inattentive and go
off the road. . .But in that, the
foreseeability question is: How was Stan
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that
precise time if, as Mr. DeBry said, one
in a billion chances that it would happen
right at that particular time.
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, at p. 19-20.)
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Plaintiff made a prompt objection.
21.)

(Icl. at p. 20-

Specifically, plaintiff objected that Mr. Jeffs had

misstated the law.15
Mr. Jeffs' misstatement of law was prejudicial
The only explanation for this verdict is that the jury was
confused by Mr. Jeffs' misstatements of the law.

The jury

apparently believed that foreseeabillty related to this
specific accident.

Rather, foreseeapility relates to whether

accidents of this general nature migjit happen.

(See fn. 15,

above.)
It is reversible error fori counsel to misstate the
law in closing argument.

Jensen v. jjtah Railway, 72 Utah

366, 370 P 349, 358 (1927).
For purposes of arguments ^o the jury,
counsel, of course, are required to
accept the charge and yield obedience to
it, and are not permitted %o argue
^ T h e correct statement of the law is found in Rees v.
Albertsons, 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) \
"What is necessary to
meet the test of proximate cause is t[hat it be reasonably
foreseeable, not that the particular accident would occur,
but that there is a likelihood of an accident of the same
general nature."
In Godesky v. Provo City Ccjrp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah
1984), our Supreme Court approved the following instruction:
"It is not necessary that the specific injury be foreseen as
long as a person of ordinary prudence could foresee, as a
result of his action or inaction, thg possibility of some
injury. . ."
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against it. So when counsel in effect
argued that one of the parents was
negligent, whether for the purpose of
showing that such negligence was the sole
and proximate cause or a concurring cause
of the injury, he, because of the charge,
was not within his rights, though the
argument may have been entirely in good
faith. We, of course, recognize a wide
scope and great liberality in arguments
of causes to the jury. But here the
court clearly withheld from the jury all
questions of negligence of the partners
for any and all purposes. In such case,
on timely objections, as here made, to
permit arguments, either directly or
indirectly, with respect to such
questions, tends to mislead the jury.
While the court eliminated some of the
argument, he ought to have eliminated the
whole of it, bearing on the subject, and
erred in not doing so.
The recent case of Dodson by and through Dodson v.
Robertson, 710 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. App. 1986) is also in point.
Dodson involved a child-dart case.

During closing argument,

the defense attorney was permitted to misstate the law.

The

appellate court held that:
Although regulation of jury argument
usually rests within the discretion of
the trial court, such rule does not apply
where the issue is one of law, as is the
case here. . .The judgment is reversed
and the cause remanded for a new trial.
In the case at bench, trial court did not rule on
Ostler's objection.

Rather, the court stated:
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The jury is directed to lobk at the
instructions. They set forth the law in
that regard. Statement of counsel is to
be disregarded except as it is accurate.
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, at p. 20.
However, the judge cannot simply stand on the
sideline.

He has a duty to rule, one way or the other.

The

case of Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1977) is on
point.

In Halford, the defense attorney misstated the law in

closing argument.

Plaintiff made a prompt objection.

In

response to the objection, the judge did not sustain or
overrule the objection.

Rather, the judge responded:

The jury is instructed that you are to
read the instructions of t ^ie court. The
law of this case is given j:o you in the
written instructions which you will take
to the jury room.
Of course, the judge's response in Halford is
almost identical to the court's response in this case.
above.)

(See

The appellate court ruled that,
The trial court did not correct the
statement of defendant's counsel, nor did
counsel himself do so. The terse
misstatement could have been tersely
corrected.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently spoken to this

exact point in the case of State v. ghickles,
, 85 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 3 (Utah 1988).
criminal trial.

P.2d

Shickles was a

At closing argument, the prosecutor made
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certain misstatements of law.

the defense objected,

whereupon the prosecutor partially withdrew his erroneous
statements.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

The trial judge did nothing to dispel the
erroneous impression created; indeed, the
trial judge did not even rule on the
objection.
if

ic

ic

ie

Clearly, defendant was entitled to have
the trial court rule on his objections,
and at the least, both should have been
sustained. In addition the prosecutor's
erroneous statements should have been
stricken.
•

*

•

*

Given the posture of the case when the
statement was made, at the end of the
trial during closing arguments and the
misleading impact that the statement may
well have had on the jury, the error in
this case was clearly prejudicial.
Actually, the case at Bar is stronger than
Shickles.

In Shickles, the prosecutor had actually withdrawn

one of the offensive statements.

In the case at bench, the

offensive statement remained with the jury.
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POINT V
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, WHEELER'S
LAWYER MADE IMPROPER STATEMENTS
ABOUT WHO WOULD PAY AJ^Y
ANY JUDGMENT
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney said:
This case is not to decide! how much (sic)
injuries Ralph has. . .This case is to
decide whether Wheeler, F & R Roe and
Albina are to pay for the fLnjuries to
Ralph. . .
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, ^t p. 23.)

Plaintiff

made a prompt objection.
Such arguments are highly jlmproper.

See Hill v.

Cloward, 377 P.2d 186, 14 Ut.2d 55 (ibtah 1962); Priel v.
R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 1986); and, Tomeo v.
Northern Valley Swim Club, 493 A.2d 544 (N.J. App. 1985).

In

Priel, supra, the defendant's counsel argued in closing that:
We are talking about money!that my client
will have to pay out of his own pocket.
In the face of that argument, the Supreme Court
held that:
In our view, counsel's statement implying
that his client was not insured was an
improper argument requiring reversal and
a new trial.
In Tomeo, supra, the defen4ant's counsel argued in
closing that:
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. . .[W]hen someone comes up to anyone
and says, "I've been injured and I want
you (sic) money. I want your possessions. I want your house," they must
back up the allegations to establish
that.
•

*

*

*

She's seeking money damages from my
client. That's what this case is all
about.
In response to this argument, the appellate court
held that such remarks constituted reversible error.
[W]e think the transgression of ordinary
rules of fair play was so flagrant that
on the basis of plain error another day
in court should be given to the probable
victims of their adversary's disingenuousness.
In like manner, Wheeler's comments were prejudicial
and untrue.

Any recovery would come from the insurance

carrier—not from the individuals personally.

POINT VI
UPON REMAND, OSTLER
SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO AMEND HIS
COMPLAINT TO CLAIM PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Prior to trial, Ostler made a motion to add a claim
for punitive damages.
denied.

(R. 1325-1327.)

(Tr. 37.)
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The motion was

Ostler's theory for punitive damages was that
Wheeler had driven until he was exhausted.

Specifically, he

was 25.25 hours over the 10-hour rule; 26.75 hours over the
±D
15-hour rule; and 86.25 hours over tlhe 70-hour rule.16

160.)

(Tr,

These regulations were specif Really passed to get

exhausted drivers off the road.

(Tr

159.)

In the case of Biswell v, fruncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Ut,
App. 1987), this court said:
. . .[W]e conclude that thte standard for
an award of punitive damages in cases
other than false imprisonment in Utah is
"actual malice/malice in fact" or "legal
malice," i.e., conduct that manifests a
reckless disregard or indifference to the
rights and safety of other?.
Id

at p. 84.
In this case, a jury might| conclude that Wheeler

acted recklessly by breaking Federal regulations and driving
in an exhausted condition.

Indeed, the jury may infer that

he really stopped to sleep--not to urinate.

Moreover, there

is testimony that a fatigued driver is equally as dangerous
as a drunk driver.

(Tr. 280.)

The case of Torres v. North American Van Lines, 658
P.2d 835 (Ariz. App. 1982) is on poirtt.

In Torres, a truck

-'-"Wheeler's employer, Albina, hdtd or should have had
actual knowledge of the violation. (R. 1330.)
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stuck the rear of a parked vehicle.

Expert witnesses

testified that the accident was caused by driver fatigue.

In

upholding an award of punitive damages, the court said there
was evidence indicating that:
. . .[H]e was attempting to avoid the 70hour rule 1 7 . As noted above, the avowed
purpose of the Federal regulations as 70
hours of service of drivers is to protect
the public travelling on the highways. . .A jury could logically conclude
that this manifested a wanton disregard
of the safety of others. . .
POINT V I
THE JURY WAS INCORRECTLY
INSTRUCTED ON WHEELER r S DUTY
TO SET OUT FLARES OR TRIANGLES
A.

Evidentiary Background.
Wheeler admitted that he did not set out flares or

reflective triangles after he stopped.

(Tr. 183-184.)

Ostler adduced evidence that the accident happened at 3:00
a.m. Local Time.

Ostler also introduced a statement made a

few hours from the accident in which Wheeler stated he had
been parked since 1:30 or 1:45 Pacific Standard Time (2:30 or
2:45 a.m. Mountain Standard Time).

(Tr. 191.)

Thus, Ostler

had evidence that Wheeler was stopped on the shoulder from 15
The same rule at issue in this case.
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to 30 minutes.

At trial, Wheeler c hanged his story and

claimed that he had only been stoppeji for three minutes ,
(Tr. 182.)

B,

(Compare Point II, above|. )

Applicable Law,

Wheeler was driving a truck in interstate commerce,
Thus, Wheeler's conduct was governed by a number of federal
regulations.

See generally, 49 C.F.R. §322.

These regula

tions for interstate truck drivers ppe-empt any lesser state
standard:
However, if a regulation of the Federal
Highway Administration imposes a higher
standard of care than that!law [i.e.,
state or local law], the Federal Highway
Administration regulation ipust be
complied with.
49 C.F.R. §392,2 (1970).

Wheeler's duty to set out flares or

reflective triangles was governed by I.e.C. regulations.
Thurston v. Ballou, 505 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. 1987).
C.F.R. §392.22(b) states:
[W]henever a vehicle is stepped upon the
shoulder of a highway fromjany cause
other than necessary traffic stops, the
driver shall as soon as possible, but in
any event within 10 minutes, place
warning devices [flares or|reflective
triangles].
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Thus, Wheeler had a duty to set out flares or reflective
triangles "as soon as possible."

The outside limit of "as

soon as possible" is set by regulation at 10 minutes.

C.

Instruction to the Jury.

In accordance with 49 C.F.R. §322.22(b), Ostler
requested a jury instruction that:
Federal regulations require that after
stopping on the shoulder, Wheeler placed
[flares or triangles] behind his truck as
soon as possible, but in any event within
10 minutes.
*

•

*

•

•

*

•

•*•

However, if you find that Wheeler was
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is
for you to determine whether or not
Wheeler set out the flares or triangles
as soon as possible.
(R. 1618.)
The trial court's instruction was largely the same
but contained an important variance:
However, if you find that defendant
Wheeler was parked for less than 10
minutes, it is for you to determine
whether or not Wheeler should nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles
under the existing circumstances.
(R. 1670 (emphasis added).)
error.

(Tr. 951-952; 956.)
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Ostler's counsel objected to the

The error is obvious.

By Jfederal law, Wheeler

should have to set out flares or trijangles "as soon as
possible."

The jury was instead instructed to determine

whether Wheeler should have set themj out at all, "under the
existing circumstances."

But, federal law had already

answered the question of whether Whepler should have set out
flares.

The answer was that he had to do so, "as soon as

possible."

The only question for thtIs jury was whether he did

it "as soon as possible."
The trial court's instruction, in effect, was to
determine whether a reasonable persoin "under the existing
circumstances" would have set out flares.

This allowed the

jury the leeway to conclude that because Wheeler had only
stopped for a few minutes, he didn't! really, need to use
flares or triangles, even though he could have.

In summary,

the trial court asked the jury "should" Wheeler use flares or
triangles; federal law asks "did" hel use flares or triannlps.
The instruction was erroneous.
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D.

The Erroneous Instruction was Prejudicial.

An incorrect statement of a defendant's duty is
generally prejudicial error.

Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. v.

Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978); compare, Gillespie v.
S.U.S.C., 669 P.2d 861 (Utah 1983)(no prejudice to plaintiff
where instruction held defendant to erroneously high standard
of care).

Here, the trial court held Wheeler to an er-

roneously low standard of conduct.
Further, a jury instruction on a defendant's duty
which is inconsistent or contradictory is reversible error.
Morrison v. Perry, 140 P.2d 772, 104 Utah 151 (1943).

The

fact that one of the standards given to the jury is correct
does not prevent reversible error if the other standard given
is incorrect.

Renner v. Nestor, 656 P.2d 553 (Wash. App.

1983); Hall v. Cooper, 691 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. App. 1985); Veliz
v. American Hosp., Inc., 414 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1982);
Alamo v. Roger, 448 A.2d 207 (Conn. 1982); Angus v. Liberty
Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 457 So.2d 971 (Ala. 1984).
Thus, the fact that the first paragraph of the
trial court's instruction was correct does not remove error;
instead, it makes the instruction even more confusing by
setting out two materially different standards of care.
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POINT VIII
THERE WAS NO VOIR DIRE SUFFICIENT
TO UNCOVER BIAS RELATED TO TORT REFORM PUBLICITY
Ostler submitted evidence ^>f a recent advertising
campaign (by insurance companies) designed to scare the
public about jury awards.

(R. 1255-1273.)

Indeed, Ostler

submitted a letter sent by Wheeler's insurer (Farmers
Insurance Group) to all Utah insureds several days before
trial.

(R. 1271.)

This letter titled, "You Pay for

Plaintiff's Lawyers f " told jurors that if they gave a verdict
for a plaintiff, they (jurors) would pay for it.

The Court

ruled on Ostler's voir dire in chambers and excluded certain
questions prepared by Ostler.

(Tr.

4-22.)

Ostler should have been al owed to use voir dire to
determine juror attitudes to this advertising campaign and
specifically, to determine if any jurors received Farmers'
mailing.

State v. Nichols, 734 P.2djl70 (Mont. 1987) at 173:
Voir dire must be used to determine which
jurors have been so affected by pretrial
publicity, [that] they wou d be unable to
render a fair verdict.

U.S. v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1983) at 1497:
Where there is the possibility or
likelihood that potential jurors have
been exposed to prejudicial publicity,
they must be questioned with special care
so as to insure that such publicity did
not result in bias.
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State v. Greenawalt, 624 P.2d 828 (Ariz. 1981) at 841:
An examination of the
voir dire process, is
by which to determine
influence of pretrial
jurors.

jurors, through
an effective means
the effects or
publicity on the

Without effective voir dire regarding the insurance
industry's media blitz, there was no way for Ostler to
intelligently determine whether jurors should have been
excused for cause; nor was counsel able to intelligently
exercise peremptory challenges for potential bias.
error.

This was

Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979); King v.

Westlake 572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978).

See also, Johnson v.

Hansen, 389 P.2d 330 (Or. 1964); Lowell v. Daly, 169 A.2d 888
(Conn. 1961).
Some courts disallow such voir dire where the
questions mention insurance.

Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal.Rptr.

494 (App. 1977); Maness v. Bullins, 198 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. App.
1973).

However, Ostler's voir dire questions 24-31, 33, and

36 (R. 1421-1423) have been carefully drafted to avoid using
the word insurance, or to avoid suggesting that there is insurance.

Questions 32(e), 34, 35 and 37 (R. 241) mention

insurance in a way that does not suggest that defendant has
insurance, but focus on the jurors' attitude toward the
insurance industry, and the ability to remain fair.
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Ralph Ostler's use of voir dire is further
supported by Utah Rule of Evidence, 411.

Rule 411 allows

evidence of insurance, inter alia, to show "bias or prejudice
of a witness." 1 ^

If insurance is admissible to test the bias

of a witness, it should be admissible to test the bias of a
juror.

Furthermore, the voir dire questions only probed

juror bias toward insurance generally, and made no implication that Wheeler was in fact insured.
The court did ask question 13 (R. 241) which was
very broad and basically asked the jurors if they felt they
were impartial.

While this is helpful, a juror's own

assessment of impartiality is insufficient to protect against
unintentional or unconscious bias.

^tate v. Ball, 685 P.2d

1055 (Utah 1984)(juror's statement of impartiality not
conclusive).

Also, Darbin v. Nourse, 774 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir.

1981)(general inquiry of juror prejudice insufficient to
reveal unconscious or unacknowledged bias).

People who are

most biased are at least likely to admit any bias.

it5

Rule 411. Liability Insurance: "Evidence that a
person was or was not insured against liability is not
admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or
otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when
offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency,
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness."
(Emphasis added.)
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It is highly questionable whether a juror who has
read and believed this advertising can be impartial and
unbiased,

"[E]ven a single exposure to one of those ads can

dramatically lower the amount of award a juror is willing to
give."

Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65

A.B.A.J. 68, 69 (Jan. 1979).

Furthermore, Ostler could have

used a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who may have
been exposed to the tort reform campaign.

The trial court's

restrictive voir dire prevented Ostler from identifying
jurors who may have ben affected consciously or subconsciously by tort reform propaganda.

This left a jury able to

perform a one-time "tort reform" on Ostler's case.

POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING OSTLER r S
VIDEOTAPE DEMONSTRATION

A.

Background.

Ostler claimed that "but for" Wheeler's negligence
in parking his semi-truck on the shoulder of 1-15, no
accident would have occurred.

The jury may have concluded

that, even if Wheeler had not been parked in Ostler's path,
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Ostler would have driven off the road and overturned causing
serious injury to Ralph in any eventj

Ostler hired Val

Shupe, a police officer and accident reconstructionist, to
analyze this question.

Wheeler made a motion in limine to

exclude Shupe's reconstruction videojtape.

(R. 968.)

The

trial court granted the motion, and JShupe's videotape was
excluded.

(R. 1197.)

The videotape is at R. 997.

In light

of the court's ruling, Ostler did no[t call Shupe, whose
testimony would largely have involve^ the evidence in the
videotape.
B.

Val Shupe's Opinion on Causatiofi,
Val Shupe gave an expert obinion that if Wheeler's

truck were not parked on the side of the road, Ostler would
probably not have rolled his truck.
QUESTION (BY MR. JEFFS) MV question is,
without knowing, without being a
psychologist, do you have enough factors
that you could have said with any degree
of certainty what would have happened if
the truck had not been there?
THE WITNESS:

Yes, sir, I din.

QUESTION (BY MR. JEFFS)

What?

ANSWER: It would be my opinion that he
probably would have been slightly off the
shoulder and back on. There's probably
one of three scenarios or four scenarios
he could have taken. He would have went
off the shoulder, or slightly off and
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came back on in his own lane. He would
have went out into the right hand as we
demonstrated in the video, at which time
we know he wouldn't have rolled over, but
we did it on a video. He could have made
a jerking motion, corrected, and came
back into the inside lane, or he could
have made a jerking motion and gone
straight on over.
But there's no indication based on my
opinion, based on the information that I
have, that he would have rolled the
vehicle, because I'm not a psychologist,
I don't know whether that's going to
happen or not. And so I think he would
have probably taken one of the other
three scenarios.
(Val Shupe Depo., p. 48-50.)

C.

Val Shupefs Qualifications.

Mr. Shupe is a police officer of 14 years duration.
(Id. p. 3.)

He has had training for accident reconstruction

from the Northwest Traffic Institute in Illinois on two
separate occasions (Ld., p. 5 ) , as well as several courses
at two California community colleges (Rl. , p. 6 ) . Mr. Shupe
is an instructor with the Utah Peace Officer's Standards and
Training (I_d. , p. 4 ) , and an accident reconstruction
instructor at the California Community College in Sacramento,
California (Id.., p. 8 ) .
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D.

Legal Standard.

The determination of a tri&l court that an
experiment is substantially similar T:O the subject of the
occurrence is reviewed de novo:
Whether substantial similarity does exist
is a question which is reviewable by the
appellate courts in the sai^e manner as is
any other question of law.
Short v. G.M.C. , 320 S.E.2d 19, 20 (ik.C. App. 1984).

The

question of substantial similarity i^ one of conditional
relevance under 104(b).

If the evidence before the trial

court would support a jury finding of substantial similarity,
the evidence is admissible for the jury to weigh.
v. U.S. ,

U.S.

Huddleston

, 10^1 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d

771 (1988).

Ec

Legal Analysis.
1.

The Videotape Was Admissibjje for Illustrative
Purposes.
The videotape re-creation by Shupe was admissible

at a minimum, simply as an illustrati^ve aid to Shupe's expert
testimony.

Witnesses are customarily allowed to illustrate

their testimony by using charts or diagrams.

The only

foundation is whether the visual aid will assist the witness
in explaining his testimony.
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Zurzolol v. GMC, 69 F.R.D. 469

(E.D. Pa. 1975).

Of course, theoretically the visual aid may

be excluded under 403(b) considerations.

However, Wheeler

did not identify any unfair prejudice under Rule 403(b) from
the videotape.
Videotapes and films offered for illustrative
purposes and not as a re-enactment of the accident are
generally admitted.

Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co.,

Inc., 398 A.2d 490 (Md. App. 1979) (helpful to jury to
receive visual support for expert's opinion); Szeliga v. GMC,
728 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1984) (aid to jury to understand
opinion of defendant's expert; differences between videotape
and actual event go to weight, not admissibility); Millers
National Insurance Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d
93 (10th Cir. 1958) (lack of similarity of movie to actual
event was not important because movie was offered simply as
illustrative aid to tedious "professorial" testimony of
experts).

Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to

admit the videotape as an illustrative aid.

Young v. IJL1.

Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 618 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir. 1980) (abuse of
discretion to refuse to allow movie offered to illustrate
plaintiff's theory of the case).
Wheeler correctly conceded that a film or videotape
of a re-enactment of an accident under substantially similar
conditions is admissible.

However, apart from any questions
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of substantial similarity, the vi deottape was admissible for a
more limited purpose as an illustrat ive aid.

Of course, it

would have been appropriate for the Court to instruct the
jury that the videotape was for illu ptrative purposes only
and not as substantive evidence.

Z ur zolo v. GMC, supra;

Millers National Insurance Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co.,
supra
2.

The Demonstration was)Proper Substantive
Evidence.

An experiment done under substantially similar
conditions is admissible.

DiRosario v. Havens, 242 Cal.Rptr,

423 (App. 1987).
The Shupe videotape was supported by Mr. Shupe's
description of the substantial similarities between the
accident and the re-creation.

The p&th of the pick up used

in the film to represent the Ostler vehicle followed the
same path as the Ostler vehicle.
para. 11.)

(sliupe Affidavit, R. 1027,

A sleeping bag containing sand bags weighing the

same as Ralph was placed in the bed <t>f the pick up.
1029, para. 8.)

(R.

Shupe calculated th& most probable speed of

the Ostler pick up at 48 miles per hour (R. 1029, para. 7 ) .
The truck used in the videotape was then driven at 4 8 miles
per hour as verified by Shupe's radaip gun (R. 1030, para.
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11).

The vehicles used in the re-creation approximate as

nearly as possible the actual vehicles involved.
para. 8.)

(R. 1029,

Shupe summarized the similarities as follows:
All physical conditions during the
videotape demonstration were as nearly
identical to those existing at the time
of the accident, with the exception that
the demonstration occurred during
daylight hours, whereas the accident
occurred at night.

(R. 1030, at para. 8.)
Wheeler's objection listed a number of "dissimilarity."

These all revolved around a single objection:

that the stunt driver who drove the pick up used in the video
may not have reacted in the same way that Stephen Ostler
might have reacted at the time of the accident.

Shupe agreed

that only God knows exactly how Ostler would have reacted.
(Shupe depo., p. 54.)

However, the videotape never purported

to show with absolute certitude what Ostler would have done.
It did accurately show the scenario which was most probable
according to Ralph's expert, Val Shupe.

The fact that there

were possible, but unlikely, differences in the reaction of
Stephen Ostler and the stunt driver went to weight, not
admissibility.
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Precise reproduction of circumstances is
not required, particularly! where any
differences are explainable by an expert
witness.
Short v. GMC, supra, 320 S.E.2d, at J2 0.

If Wheeler's

objection was correct, then no one cpuld ever re-create an
auto accident, because no one can ever say for sure that the
stunt driver reacts the same as the jreal driver.

Of course,

courts have often admitted auto accident reconstruction
despite this obvious lack of precisejsimilarity.

Wheeler's

objections were like those in DiRosario v. Havens, supra.
The DiRosario court found that the lack of precise similarity
was no reason to exclude the videotape reconstruction.

See

also Zoller v. Winters, 712 P.2d 525l(Idaho 1985).

POINT X
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON
INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAU$E WAS INCORRECT

£

The Court's Instruction No J 27 reads as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 7
If an injury arises
from two distinct causes, consideration
then must be given to the question
whether the causal connection between the
conduct of the party responsible for the
first cause and the injury was broken by
the intervention of a new, indeoendent
cause.
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If so, the person responsible for
the first cause would not be liable for
the injury. If, however, the intervening
cause or the likelihood of an occurrence
of the same general nature was foreseen
or should reasonably have been foreseen
by the person responsible for the first
cause, then such person's conduct would
be the proximate cause of the injury,
notwithstanding the intervening cause,
and he would be liable therefor.
Thus, if you find the collision of
the vehicle driven by Stephen Ostler with
a tractor-trailer of Albina Transfer
Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of
the highway, or the likelihood of an
occurrence of the same general nature,
was within the natural and continuous
sequence of events which might reasonably
be foreseen to follow the actions of
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that
the actions of Stanley Wheeler were a
concurring proximate cause of the
collision, even thought the later
negligent act of Stephen Ostler cooperated to cause the accident.
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler
in causing the collision were of such
character as not reasonably to be
foreseen in the natural and continuous
sequence of events started by Stanley
Wheeler, then the acts of Stephen Ostler
are the independent intervening cause
and, therefore, the sole proximate cause
of the injury.
Ostler objected on various grounds.

(Tr. 953-954.)

The major flaw in Instruction No. 27 is that the
term intervening independent cause (as introduced in the
first paragraph of Instruction No. 25) is not defined for the
jury.

The Restatement Torts,2d includes 13 sections defining
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that concept.

(See Restatement §440^453.)

Of course, all of

those sections are not relevant to this case; however, §447
is relevant.

(For complete discussion of §447, see pages 13-

15, above.)

Other sections are also relevant.

(See Point

XI, below.)

In the absence of a faijf definition, the jury

was left to flounder.
Second, Instruction No. 25|assumes that "foreseeability" is the only test which is important in determining
causation in this case.

That is simply wrong.

A textual

description would be as follows:
The Restatement, Torts,2d Contains a
detailed, definitional discussion of an
intervening force—which by its active
operation, may or may not prevent an
actor's antecedent negligence from being
a "legal" cause in bringing about harm to
another person. . .The Restatement,
Torts,2d, stresses some six elements as
the important considerations in determining whether an intervening force is a
superceding cause of harm to another,
thus breaking the chain of causation.
Speiser, The American Law of Torts, Vol. 3, §11.9 (1983)
(emphasis added).
Third, the instruction says that, "if the actions
of Stephen Ostler in causing the coll)ision were. . .not
reasonably to be foreseen. . . ",. the chain of causation was
broken.

This is saying that the precjise or specific manner

of harm or accident ("the actions of Stephen Ostler")
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must be foreseeable.

Instead, only a generalized risk of

harm need be foreseeable; the specific sequence of events
need not be foreseeable.

Rees v. Albertsons, supra.;

Restatement of Torts,2d §435, "Foreseeability of Harm or Its
Manner of Occurrence."
Finally, Instruction No. 25 is hopelessly confusing.

It is likely that the judges of this Court will have to

read that instruction two, three or four times to understand
it.

It is simply impossible for a lay person without three

years of law school to have any idea of the meaning of that
language.
The object of jury instructions is to
enlighten the jury on their problems.
Instructions should fit the facts shown,
making them as clear in meaning and
concise as possible in lay people's
language without belaboring definitions.
Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Ut.2d 186, 398 P.2d 24
(1965).

When instructions tend to confuse the jury, reversal

is proper.

Burton v. Fisher Controls, 713 P.2d 1137, on

rehearing 723 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1986).
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POINT XI
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE I DIRECTED A
VERDICT AGAINST WHEELER ON CAUSATION
A.

Procedural Background.

The trial court directed aI verdict that Wheeler was
negligent as a matter of law in parking on the side of the
freeway.

At the close of plaintiff'^ evidence, Ostler moved

for a directed verdict on causation,

(Tr. 771. )

The trial

court denied the motion.

B.

Legal Standard.

A directed verdict is appropriate if reasonable
minds cannot differ that Wheeler's negligence is parking on
the shoulder of the freeway was a proximate cause of Ostler's
injuries.

Mqt. Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896

(Utah 1982) .

Legal Analysis

Proximate cause limits Whe^l er's liability to those
risks of foreseeable harm created by his negligent parking:
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. . .the effort of the courts has been,
in the development of this doctrine of
proximate causation, to confine the
liability of a negligent actor to those
harmful consequences which result from
the operation of the risk, or of a risk,
the foreseeability of which rendered the
defendant's conduct negligent.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marshall, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir.
1955) .
By ruling that Wheeler was negligent, the trial
court implicitly found that Wheeler's parking on the freeway
shoulder created an unreasonable risk of:

(1) causing harm

to a class of persons of which Ostler was a member and (2)
subjecting Ostler to the hazard from which Ostler's injury
resulted.

Restatement of Torts,2d §281(b), and comment

thereto.

Stated another way, the trial court implicitly

found that Wheeler's negligent parking created an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to passengers in passing
cars (such as Ralph).
Of course, the realization of the risk of harm
actually came about through the negligent act of Stephen
Ostler straying from the travelled lane into the shoulder.
But, if Wheeler's negligence in parking created a hazard of
an accident with a negligent passing motorist, then he is
still liable.

The negligently created risk of an accident
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with another negligent motorist is t|ie act that makes Wheeler
negligent in the first place:
Sec. 449.

Tortious or Criminal Acts of
the Probability of Which Makes
Actor's Conduct Negligent

If the likelihood that a third person may
act in a particular manner is the hazard
or one of the hazards which makes the
actor negligent, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally
tortious, or criminal does not prevent
the actor from being liabl^ for harm
caused thereby.
Restatement of Torts,2d §449.

The reporter's comment to this

section explains further:
b. The happening of the v^ry event the
likelihood of which makes the actor's
conduct negligent and so subjects the
actor to liability cannot relieve him
from liability. The duty to refrain from
the act committed or to do the act
omitted is imposed to protect the other
from this very danger. To deny recovery
because the other's exposure to the very
risk from which it was the purpose of the
duty to protect him resulted in harm to
hTm, would be to deprive the other of all
protection and to make the |duty a
nullity.
(I_d. , comment (b) (emphasis added.))

The Utah Legislature

created a statutory duty not to park on the shoulder of a
high-speed freeway.

The trial court should have determined,

as a matter of law, that Wheeler's st|atutory duty (which he
breached) extended to protect innocen t passengers injured
because a negligent driver strayed in|to the shoulder.
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When

the trial court submitted the proximate cause question to the
jury, it allowed the jury "to make the statutory duty a
nullity."

(Id.)
The fact that reasonable minds could not differ on

proximate cause is illustrated by the following question:
What risks of harm (other than accidents with passing
motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent?
apparent.

None are

Certainly, the emergency lane was not for picnics

or taking in a scenic view.

Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 267

So.2d 714 (La. 1972)("this statute [parking on highway] is
designed to protect against the risk that a driver, whether
cautious or inattentive would collide with a stationary
vehicle.")

The only foreseeable harm threatened by Wheeler's

negligence was that of an accident with a passing motorist.
Since that is exactly what happened, a reasonable jury-1-^ must
find proximate causation.
Casting the analysis in the slightly different
terms of intervening force and superseding cause leads to the
same result.

If Wheeler's negligent parking created a risk

of harm to negligent passing motorists, Wheeler is still
liable:

iy

Ostler believes the jury was composed of reasonable
laymen who misunderstood proximate causation.
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Sec. 442A.

Intervening Force Risked by
Actors Conduct.

Where the negligent conduct of the actor
creates or increases the foreseeable risk
of harm through the intervention of
another force, and is a substantial
factor in causing the harmj such
intervention is not a superseding cause.
b. Where the negligence off the actor has
created the risk of harm to another
because of the likelihood of such
intervention, the actor is not relieved
of responsibility merely because the risk
which he has created has in fact been
fulfilled. The same is triie where there
is already some existing risk or
possibility of the intervention, but the
negligence of the actor had increased
the risk of such intervention, or of harm
if it occurs.
Restatement of Torts,2d §442A and comment b thereto (emphasis
added).

The only way Wheeler could be excused from liability

is if Stephen Ostler's conduct was intentional and not within
the scope of the risk of harm created] by Wheeler's negligence:
Sec. 442B. Intervening Force Causing
Same Harm as That Risked by Actor's
Conduct.
Where the negligent conduct of the actor
creates or increases the risk of a
particular harm and is a substantial
factor in causing that' harm, the fact
that the harm is brought about through
the intervention of another force does
not relieve the actor of liability,
except where the harm is intentionally
caused by a third person and is not
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within the scope of the risk created by
the actor's conduct.
There was no jury question that Stephen Ostler
acted intentionally; nor was his conduct outside the risk of
foreseeable harm created by Wheeler's parking.

Thus, as a

matter of law, Stephen Ostler's negligence was not an
intervening cause.
Ostler submitted legislative history that indicated
the purpose of the statute prohibiting parking on freeways
was passed to prevent accidents between parked cars and
passing motorists.

Utah's statute (Utah Code Ann. §41-6-

103(e)) was taken verbatim from the Uniform Vehicle Code §111003 drafted by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic
Laws and Ordinances•

The Subcommittee Report recommending

the particular language used in Utah's statute states:
Several Subcommittee members suggested
that a no stopping rule will not be
obeyed because people will continue to
stop to rest (as they are advised by many
signs to d o ) , to change drivers, to read
maps, to check equipment, to eat, etc. A
majority of the Subcommittee felt, that
such stops should be made only in rest
areas and not on the controlled-access
highway where such stopping is very
hazardous.
(R. 1343.) 2 0
Awhile contained in the record, the legislative history
is a legislative fact, not an adjudicative fact, and thus not
formally a matter of evidence.
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Ostler also proferred two government studies, one
by California and one by Maryland.

These studies illustrate

the hazard that semi-trucks parked on the side of the freeway
pose to passing motorists.

The Maryland study concluded:

Parked truck accidents are much more
severe than other parked vehicle
accidents. The probability of being
involved in a fatal parked truck accident
is ten times greater on 55 MPH highways
compared to non 55 MPH highways.
Because parked truck ac cidents are
much more severe than othejt parked
vehicle accidents, some type of action
should be taken to get the trucks off the
shoulders of the highways, It is obvious
that passengers and operators of vehicles
have a much better chance f survival if
clear recovery area is pro^J>ided. Parked
tractor trailers on shoulders of our high
speed highways introduce unnecessary
obstacles in the clear recovery area. It
should be noted that finding a place of
tired and probably exhausted truck
drivers to park their trucks is a
problem. However, due to severity of
parked truck accidents, the trucks should
not be allowed to park on the shoulders
of 55 MPH highways.
(R. 1359)(emphasis added).
The California study reached a similar conclusion:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Perhaps the most significant factor
affecting the increase in the number of
fatal roadside rear end accidents on
California freeways is the [number of
trucks involved. . .
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In 1963, General Motors made a study on
the "Relation of Cross-Section Design and
Highway Safety" in which it produced a
"hazard" curve of GM Proving Ground
accidents. These "accidents" occurred
under ideal conditions and in the hands
of carefully trained and supervised
drivers. The study showed that 80
percent of the cars deviated less than 33
feet from the edge of the road and 40
percent deviated less than 10 feet.
Approximately 85 percent of the vehicles
involved in a fatal roadside rear end
accident in California in 1983 and 1984
deviated less than 10 feet from the edge
of the traveled way before striking
another vehicle parked on the shoulder or
median. Over 40 percent of the vehicles
struck in these roadside accidents in
1984 were parked for non-emergency
reasons. For maximum safety, it is
imperative that the roadside remain clear
of obstacles so that a driver has ample
opportunity to regain control and avoid
serious difficulties.
* * * *

Truck drivers, in particular, need to be
aware of the danger of stopping or
parking on freeway shoulders, especially
for non-emergencies such as checking
loads, tires and air lines, reading maps,
and sleeping. Trucking organizations
should notify members of the danger of
parking on the shoulders and remind
truckers to plan ahead for coffee breaks,
sleeping arrangements and vehicle
maintenance.
(R. 1365-1368)(emphasis added).)

The bottom line (literally)

to the California study is that:

"Ultimately, if the parked

vehicle had not been there, an accident might not have
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occurred."

(id. at 1368. J^1

The te^or of all three of these

reports is that roadside parking by jtruckers is extremely
dangerous to passing motorists.

As k matter of law and

policy, the courts should extend the protection of the "no
parking" statute to injured passengers such as Ralph.
CONCLUSION
Ostler seeks a directed vetdict against Wheeler on
the issue of proximate cause.

In the alternative, Ostler

seeks a new trial at which the trial court will correctly
admit evidence, permit proper impeachment, and correctly
instruct the jury on proximate cause!

If the case is

remanded for a new trial, Ostler shoijild be permitted to add a
claim for punitive damages.
DATED this

/ h

day of

/y.[- -ry^. :

, 1988

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
By:

r

^Government reports are also legislative facts which a
court can freely resort to for determining questions of law
and policy. Ostler suggested that the trial court take
judicial notice of these reports; alternatively, Ostler
proferred Slade Hulbert to lay the foundation for these
documents' authenticity. (R. 1343.) The trial court did '
not rule on either request, but apparently treated them as
legislative facts. See O'Hanlon v. Hartford Ace. & Indent.
Co., 457 F.Supp. 961 (D. Del. 1978); cf. Barber v. Ponti, 772
F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1985)(en banc)(judicial notice taken by
appellate court of official government statistics).
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EXHIBIT A

In An Emergency
P\nrn Warning Devices

EXHIBIT B

•3
ffirmed in all
ie is remanded
ioner may act
ent with both
Services and
aperiy noticed

THOMPSON,

ROBY BY AND THROUGH ROBY r. KINGSLEY
Qt«M4*2SdJ47*9 (FlmJip+lDi*.

1. Stipulations ^»14(10)
Stipulation between parties to workers'
compensation case as to date of maximum
medical improvement was not binding
where facts presented at hearing on award
of lump-sum advance of permanent total
disability benefits were at variance with
the stipulation.
2. Workers' Compensation <*»1638
Record failed to support occurrence of
maximum medical improvement to support
award of lump-sum advance of permanent
total disability benefits.

Mary E. Ingley, Tallahassee, for appellant/Special Disability Trust Fund.

RUST FUND,
State Farm
Appellants,

ppellee.

of Florida,

awarded lump*
total disability
peal was taken.
»al, Shivers, J.,
on maximum
ot binding, and
: occurrence of
ment so as to

ainst property the
seding. Compare
v. City of Zephyr*
Z\ 1986). construia Statutes, as to
dcr § 329.01. F5.

Gerald W. Pierce of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, F t Myers, for appellants/Ingram's Hardware and State Farm
Ins.
Richard L Cervelli, Richard I. Cervelli
P.-A-, Naples, for appellee.
SHIVERS, Judge.
The Special Disability Trust Fund, Ingram's Hardware (employer) and State
Farm Insurance Company (carrier) appeal
the deputy commissioner's award of a
lump-sum advance of permanent total disability benefits to Paul D. Myers (claimant)
for injuries sustained on April 10, 1981.
We reverse.
A lump-sum advance is not properly
awarded before a claimant has reached
maximum medical improvement (MMI).
Butler's Dairy, Inc. v. Honeycutt, 432
So.2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); City of St
Petersburg Beach v. Harper, 8 FCR 333
(1974); Section 440.20(12Xa), Florida Statutes (1981). In this case the parties have stipulated to MMI as of January 11, 1984. The
deputy commissioner approved the stipulation and incorporated it by reference in his
orders. However, the record fails to support the occurrence of MMI.
Although the psychologist did testify
claimant reached psychological MMI on

Fla.
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January 11, 1984, the psychiatrist testified
claimant had not yet reached MMI but
migpt within six months of February 20,
1984. No findings as to MMI for physical
problems were made by the neurologist or
any| other doctor.
[1,2] The January 11, 1984 date is not
binding when the facts presented at the
hearing are at variance with, and show
good cause for modification of the stipulation. Espada Enterprises, Inc. v. SpirQ,
481 So.2d 1263, 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986);
Leeks Shoes v. Cucuzza, 429 So.2d 401, 402
(FlaL 1st DCA 1983); Woods v. Greater
Naples Care Center, 406 So.2d 1172, 1173
(FlaL 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So.2d
876 (Fla.1982). The lump-sum advance
must be reversed under Butler's Dairy
because the evidence fails to support the
occurrence of MMI regardless of the stipulated date.

REVERSED.
EkVIN and THOMPSON, JJ.f concur.
(p f «T»UWHtVWt«>

Santiuel N. ROBY, a minor, By and
Through his natural parent and guardiaji, Judith R. ROBY, and Judith R.
Roby, Individually, Appellants,
r.
Lee KINGSLEY and Barry
Ratliff, Appellees.
No. BH-499.
district Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.
Aug. 7, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1986.
Automobile passenger, who was injured when automobile struck trailer-rig
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parked in emergency lane, and his mother
brought suit against driver of automobile
and driver of rig. The Circuit Court, Alachua County, John J. Crews, J., entered
judgment in favor of plaintiff against automobile driver and against plaintiffs and in
favor of driver of rig, and plaintiffs appealed The District Court of Appeal, Shivers,
J«, held that: (1) evidence that rig was
illegally parked partially in emergency lane
and failed to display required triangular
reflector entitled passenger to standard
concurring cause instruction, and (2) passenger was entitled to examine his expert
about highway design and construction and
specific purpose of emergency lane to provide reasonable opportunity for recovery of
out-of-control vehicle, in order to determine
whether automobile driver should have
been able to recover from drifting into
emergency lane.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Automobiles <t»246<57)
Evidence that tractor-trailer rig was
illegally parked partially in emergency lane
and failed to display required triangular
reflector behind rig at time rig was struck
by automobile, resulting in injury to passenger, entitled passenger to standard concurring cause instruction, in action brought
against driver of rig and driver of automobile. West's F.S.A. § 316.194 (now § 316.124); § 316.301.
2. Appeal and Error ^1060.1(2), 1067
Jury may have been misled by trial
court's failure to give concurrent cause instruction and by argument of counsel for
driver of tractor-trailer rig that, in order to
find driver of rig liable, jury was required
to determine that driver of rig was the
clause of accident, thus entitling passenger
to a new trial, in action against driver of
automobile which struck rig and driver of
rig, since jury could have been misled into
believing that, if automobile driver's negligence was more significant cause of injury,
dnver of rig would be relieved of liability.

3. Automobiles «=»242(7)
In order for driver of tractor-trailer rig
to be liable for injuries to passenger of
automobile which struck rig while it was
illegally parked, passenger did not have to
prove that driver of rig caused accident,
but only that his conduct, in combination
with act of automobile driver, caused accident
4. Evidence e»514(2)
Automobile passenger injured when
automobile collided with parked tractortrailer rig was entitled to examine his ex-.
pert about highway design and construction and specific purpose of emergency
lane to provide reasonable opportunity for
recovery of out-of-control vehicle, in order
to determine whether defendant automobile
driver should have been able to recover
from drifting into emergency lane, and
automobile driver's expert should have
been permitted to testify as to whether
parked tractor*trailer was concurring cause
of accident, in action brought against automobile driver and driver of rig, as such
testimony would have had direct bearing on
issue of concurring causation.
5. Damages <^»170
Evidence that passenger injured when
automobile collided with parked tractortrailer rig had prior homosexual relationship was irrelevant on issue of injuries and
was inadmissible, in action arising from
accident.
6. Evidence «=»146
Even if evidence of prior homosexual
relationship of automobile passenger injured in accident were relevant, it would be
inadmissible, in action brought by passenger arising from accident, on basis that
value of such evidence would be substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. West's F.S.A. § 90.403.
7. Appeal and Error <$=»1050.2
Trial court's error in admitting evidence of automobile passenger's prior homosexual relationship, in action arising
from automobile accident, required reversal, since evidence was irrelevant to his
injuries and could have been prejudicial.
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8. Damages <^»135
Award of $50,000 to mother of passenger injured in automobile accident was
clearly inadequate, in light of uncontradicted evidence that mother incurred $170,000
in past medical expenses for passenger before he reached majority.

Larry Beltz and Samuel Newman of L.D.
Beltz SL Associates, St Petersburg and
Edna L Caruso, West Palm Beach, for
appellants.
Robert A. White and John D. Jopling of
Dell, Graham, Willcox, Barber, Henderson
& Cates, Gainesville, for appellees.
SHIVERS, Judge.
This is an appeal by plaintiffs, Samuel N.
Roby and his mother Judith R. Roby, from
a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and a final
costs judgment against plaintiffs entered
upon a jury verdict in a negligence action.
Whether refusal to instruct the jury with
Standard Jury Instruction 5.1b on concurring cause was error, 2) Whether limiting
the examination of experts by plaintiffs'
counsel was error, 3) Whether admitting
evidence that the plaintiff had a prior homosexual relationship was error, 4) Whether the damages awarded plaintiffs were
inadequate.
Samuel N. Roby (plaintiff/appellant) was
16 years old when he sustained brain damage while a hitchhiker passenger in a vehicle driven by intoxicated Barry Ratliff
(defendant/appellee). The car collided at
night with the rear of a tractor-trailer rig
parked in the emergency lane of the highway. Lee Kingsley (defendant/appellee),
the driver and operator of the rig, was
improperly parked in the emergency lane
VtoiouX reflects earning deVices.
I.

Standard Jury Instruction 5.1b reads as follows:
In* order to be regarded as a legal cause of
[loss] [injury] [or] [damage], negligence need
not be the only cause. Negligence may be a
legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage]
492S0.2*-19
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Samuel Roby and his mother sued Ratliff
and Kingsley for damages. A default was
entered against Ratliff. Kingsley was returned a jury verdict of no negligence. Filial judgment was entered in favor of plainoils and against Ratliff in the amount of
^700,000 for Samuel Roby and $50,000 for
Judith Roby, and against plaintiff in favor
of Kingsley. A final costs judgment was
entered for Kingsley and against plaintiffs
fbr $6,658.
The first issue on appeal is whether the
court erred in refusing to give Standard
Jury Instruction 5.1b on concurring cause.1
The purpose of the concurring cause instruction is to negate the idea that a defendant is excused from the consequences
of his negligence by reason of some other
cause concurring in time and contributing
to the same damage. Little v. Miller, 311
9o.2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
In Ruiz v. Cold Storage and Insulation
Contractors, Inc., 306 So.2d 153 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1975) cert denied, 316 So.2d 2S6 (Fla.
1975U the court held it was. error for a trial
judge not to instruct the jury on concurrent
causation when two criteria are met. First,
the facts as viewed most favorably to the
plaintiff support the need for such an instruction, and second, the failure to give
the instruction may mislead the jury. Id.
See also, Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So.2d
1216, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), Little v.
MilUr, 311 So.2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
The trial court's refusal to give a concurring cause instruction in Ruiz was error
because the jury could have reasonably
concluded in the absence of such an instruction that they must return a verdict
for the more negligent of the two negligent
drivers involved in the intersection collion. Ruiz, 306 So.2d at 154.
[1] Applying the facis of this case to
die first Ruiz criterion, the record suffivpxt&y 4%?rrtrTiVcr2rf££> *&% powA&fty t>£ zvtieven though it operates in combination with
[the act of another] [some natural cause] [or]
some other cause if such other cause occurs at
the same time as the negligence and if the
negligence contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [injury] [or] [damage].
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current negligence on the part of Kingsley
to warrant the requested instruction.
Kingsley was illegally parked partially in
the emergency lane in violation of Section
316.194, Florida Statutes and failed to display the required triangular reflectors behind his vehicle as required by Section 316.301, Florida Statutes.
[2] As to the second Ruiz criterion, the
trial court's failure to give the concurrent
cause instruction might very well have misled the jury. Standard Jury Instruction
5.1a 2 does not address concurring causes
and the jury was not instructed about joint
and several liability. The concurring cause
instruction would have specifically dispelled any erroneous belief by the jury that
they must find only one legal cause of the
plaintiffs' damages. In this particular
case, the jury may also have been misled
by the fact that defendant Ratliff was
found liable by default as a matter of law.
It is not difficult to imagine that the jury
could have believed Ratliff s liability as a
matter of law excused any liability on the
part of Kingsley.
[3] The jury may also have been misled
by the following closing argument of
Kingsley's counsel:
. . . [t]he Court is going to tell you that in
order to find an individual, in this case
Mr. Kingsley, at fault, you not only need
to determine that he was negligent but
that his negligence was the cause of the
accident
It's a two step process.
You've got to find not only that he was
negligent, but you have to find that his
negligence caused the accident (Emphasis added).
In fact plaintiff did not have to prove that
Kingsley caused the accident only that his
conduct in combination with the act of
another, caused the accident We conclude
the jury may have believed that both drivers were negligent but the jury could have
been misled into believing that Ratliffs
2. Standard Jury Instruction 5.1a reads as follows:
Negligence is a legal cause of [loss] [injury]
[or] [damage] if it directly and in natural and
continuous sequence produces or contributes

negligence, as the more significant "cause"
of the injury, relieved Kingsley of any liability. We therefore conclude from the evidence and the absence of a concurring
cause instruction that the jury could well
have been misled. Based on this error, a
new trial on all the issues is awarded.
[4] The second issue oh appeal is
whether limiting the examination of experts by plaintiffs' counsel on the issue of
causation was error. We hold that it was.
Plaintiffs' expert should have been allowed
to testify about highway design and construction, specifically the purpose of an
emergency lane to provide a reasonable
opportunity for recovery of an out of control vehicle. The jury should have had this
information to determine whether Ratliff
would have been able to recover from drifting into the emergency lane. Defendant's
expert should have been allowed to testify
as to whether the parked tractor-trailer
was a concurring cause of the accident
This excluded evidence had a direct bearing
on the issue of concurring causation.
[5-7] The third issue on appeal is
whether evidence of Samuel Roby's prior
homosexual relationship was properly admitted at trial. We reverse on the basis
that the evidence was irrelevant to his injuries and could have been prejudicial Even
if it were relevant it would be inadmissible
since its value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Section 90.403, Florida Statutes.
We reverse the fourth issue on appeal on
the basis that the damages awarded plaintiffs were inadequate. Since defendant
Kingsley was found not liable on the trial
level, the issue of inadequate damages is
raised only as to defendant Ratliff. However, because reversal based on the lack of
a concurring cause instruction necessitates
Kingsley's retrial on the issue of liability,
damages may be assessed against Kingsley
if he is subsequently found liable.
substantially to producing such [loss] [injury]
[or] [damage], so that it can reasonably be
said that, but for the negiigen«, the [loss]
[injury 1 [or J [damage] would not have occurred.
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[8] Judith Roby's award of 550,000 is
clearly inadequate in light of the uncontradicted evidence that she incurred $170,000
in past medical expenses for her son before
he reached majority. Where the award is
less than the undisputed medicals, the
award is inadequate. Stroker v. Lynch,
335 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert
denied, 341 So.2d 1083 (Fla.1977). Reversal of the other issues on appeal could
result in a greater damages award for
Samuel Roby.
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new
trial including damages.
ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
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Criminal Law <*=»494
Conviction for sexual battery could not
be sustained on testimony of child protection team interviewer that child demonstrated knowledge, personality traits, and
conduct consistent with sexually abused
children and opinion that child was sexually
abused by father, determination that defendant had penetrated or had union with
miuth or anus of child with penis or other
object could come only from conjecture
bajsed upon inferences drawn by interviewer! from interview with victim. West's
F.&.A. §§ 800.02 et seq., 827.01 et seq.

iMichael E. Allen, Public Defender, and
Kathleen Stover, Asst Public Defender,
Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Norma J.
Mungenast, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee,
for appellee.
BARFIELD, Judge.

Isaac YOUNGBLOOD, Appellant,
r.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. BF-32.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.
Aug. 7, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1986.

Defendant was convicted of sexual battery and lewd assault on a child in the
Circuit Court, Columbia County, Royce Agner, J.f and he appealed. The District
Court of Appeal, Barfield, J., held that
conviction for sexual battery could not be
sustained on testimony of child protection
team interviewer concerning knowledge
and 'traits of child and opinion that child
was sexually abused by father.
Reversed.

Defendant, Isaac Youngblood, appeals
his convictions for sexual battery under
cqunt I and lewd assault on a child under
ccjunt II. After a thorough review of the.
record, we find no error in defendant's
conviction under count II for lewd assault
oik a child and his sentence to 15 years
imprisonment
As to the conviction for count I, we do
nit believe an exposition of the seamy details of the record in this case will serve
ahy useful purpose as those details are
"already known to the parties. Neither do
we need to address numerous evidentiary
errors in this record as our disposition of
the appeal may rest on the record as submitted to the jury.
I When the trial judge precluded the jury
fjk>m considering the testimony of Dr. Elizzbeth EngleharZ as it reteted to statement
niade by Jason Youngblood as substantive
evidence of Jason's identification of his father as the perpetrator of a sexual battery
against him, the jury was left only with the
testimony of Linda Cooper from which to
conclude that a sexual battery had oc-

EXHIBIT C

Rule 404.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE
TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS;
OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. [Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:!
*

*

*

(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Actsi Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be; admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ibsence of mistake or accident.
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Rule 608,
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AN^>
CONDUCT OF WITNESS
*

*

(b) Specific Instances of Conduct^ Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for $ie purpose of
attacking or supporting his credibility, oth^r than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, ma}' nbt be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in tjhe discretion of
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the fitness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.

